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Abstract. The Special Composition Question asks under what conditions a plurality of objects
form another, composite object. We propose a condition grounded in our scientific knowledge
of physical reality, the essence of which is that objects form a composite object when and only
when they are in a bound state – whence our Bound State Proposal. We provide a variety of
reasons in favour of a mereological theory that accommodates our Proposal. We consider but
reject another proposal, which is quantum-physical in nature: the Entanglement Proposal. We
close by responding to Teller’s ‘Suit Objection’.
1. Preamble
P. van Inwagen (1987, p. 23) raised the questionwhat condition physical objects have to satisfy in order to
compose another physical object. Three answers to this so-called Special Composition Question (whence-
forth: the Question) have been considered and debated: merelogical Nihilism, according to which there
are no composite objects, only elementary particles; mereological Universalism, according to which any
collection of physical objects compose another physical object; and Van Inwagen’s moderate answer
(1990: 82), according to which physical objects compose another one iff their activity constitutes a life.
All three versions scandalise our intuitive judgements: Nihilism and Van Inwagen deny that atoms,
molecules, rocks, trucks, planets and galaxies qualify as bona fide physical objects, whereas Universalism
affirms that, say, the nose of Cleopatra, the Erasmus suspension bridge in Rotterdam and the red giants
in the Andromeda Nebula by contrast do. Such objects strike us as mereological monsters. While we
agree that philosophical clarity and coherence with the sciences trump common sense any time, we pre-
fer a view that is clear and coherent but does not trump common sense so pervasively. We expound such
a view here. Slightly more specifically, we would like to propose another answer to the Question, one
that both vindicates more of our common-sensical judgments and is firmly rooted in relevant portions
of scientific knowledge.
2. The Bound-State Proposal
Consider an arbitrary but finite number of physical objects. They may or may not be interacting with
one another. Whenever they interact, they may or may not be in a bound state, which by definition is a
state in which the objects have a total energy that is negative (E < 0). In that case, the potential energy
of the composing objects (which is always < 0) is larger in absolute value than their kinetic energy
(which is always> 0); their total energy is the sum of their kinetic and potential energy. (The categorical
attribution of a quantitative property of energy to objects presuppose a background of classical physics.
True enough. When we move to quantum-physical theories, notably quantum mechanics, an exactly
similar story can be told in terms of expectation-values of the Hamiltonian, which is the energy operator.
These slight complications need not detain us here.) Our proposal now reads: physical objects form a
composite object iff these physical objects interact and are in a common bound state, where ‘common bound
state’ means that the composing objects are in the potential well that results of their mutual physical
interaction. An object a then is a part of object b iff a is among the objects that compose b. We call this
the Bound-State Proposal. In order to find out whether objects are in a common bound state — which is
an epistemic, not a metaphysical problem — one must find a physical theory in the currently accepted
body of scientific knowledge that describes these objects as interacting and being in a bound state as a
result. Note that the mere fact of interaction is a necessary but not sufficient condition on composition;
what needs to be added is that the resulting state they are in is bound.
Let’s give a couple of examples of the sorts of objects that our Proposal will sanction. An electron in
a Hydrogen atom is in the electromagnetic potential well of the Hydrogen nucleus (a proton), and thus
the atomic nucleus-electron system will qualify as an object. Once the kinetic energy of the electron has
been raised above its ionization energy, however, the electron can break free from the nucleus, and we
no longer have a bound state. Thus on our view it follows that all we have are an electron and a nucleus,
but no third, composite object in addition. Something exactly similar can be said of all terrestrial objects
which are in the gravitational potential well of the Earth. While in that well, they are parts of the
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composite system of the Earth and all Earth-bound objects. However, when a launched rocket passes
the escape velocity of the Earth, its kinetic energy has become large enough to get out of the Earth’s
gravitational potential well and it is no longer part of the mentioned composite. It should be noted that
while an inhabitant of a distant planet is in the gravitational potential well of that planet, and while
an electron bound to an earthly nucleus is in the electro-magnetic potential well of that nucleus, the
inhabitant and the planet are in a potential well distinct from that in which the electron and the nucleus
are. As such, we do not here have a further object composed of the inhabitant, planet, electron, and
nucleus, but just the two composites that we started with. We note finally that our definition may be
said to be ‘relative to physical theory’ to the extent that for every particular composite system one needs
a physical theory to describe the relevant potential well in detail. However, we know of no system
that is bound according to one accepted physical theory and not bound according to another, so this
‘relativization’ is harmless.
The fact that the distinction between bound and free (i.e. non-bound) states is a significant distinc-
tion in the physics of many-body systems is prima facie reason to think it may be significant for the
metaphysics of composite systems too. We think it is more than significant: it holds the key to a scien-
tifically informed answer to the Question. In the next Section, we discuss some reasons for adopting the
Bound-State Proposal. Following that, we sketch its ramifications for mereological theory (Section 4),
before considering an objection rooted in the phenomenon of quantum entanglement (Section 5), and
one further objection still.
3. Reasons
We begin with two clarifications. The first of these is that the Bound-State Proposal does indeed consti-
tute a moderate answer to the Question, as van Inwagen’s does, and not an extreme one. While it may be
true in a strict sense that all objects are interacting with one another, it is certainly not the case that every
object is in a bound state with every other, and thus our Proposal does not amount to Universalism. Nor
of course is it Nihilism, since plenty of collections of objects are in such states. The second clarification is
that our Proposal allows more collections of objects to qualify as composites than does Van Inwagen’s.
Collections of particles that form a living physical object are in a bound state: if the particles of a cat, say,
were not in a bound state, they would fly apart in all directions. But there are also plenty of bound states
that are not states of living systems, such as atomic nuclei, atoms, molecules, water-droplets, toasters,
mountains, planets, and galaxies. On our account, they’re all in.
With these clarifications in place, we claim that the first reason for supporting our Proposal is that it
is more congruent with common-sense judgements about what counts as an object than is the competi-
tion, where we take such judgements to include those honed through immersion in physical science. We
concede that it is in some sense unfortunate, but perhaps also unavoidable, that debates in mereological
discourse often turn on appeals to intuitive judgments as to what should and should not count as a
genuine composite object — not least because people’s intuitive judgments can diverge on this score.
Van Inwagen and others are no doubt correct to take it as plain that common sense will always prefer
moderate answers to the Question, yet we can expect disagreement on exactly which moderate answer
is the best. However, insofar as congruence with common-sense judgements counts as a reason in favour
of an answer to the Question, we submit that our own moderate Proposal performs better than van In-
wagen’s – which we believe that most will agree is unacceptably sparse. Our proposal is also faithful to
the plausible judgements, waged against Nihilism and Universalism respectively, that an atom is a bona
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fide object, and that it is so in the way that the ‘mereological sum’ of an electron and proton at arbitrary
separation is not (cf. Lowe (2008: 86)). Just as, contra Van Inwagen (2002, 197), according to physics
the mass of a table is not the sum of the masses of its (‘non-overlapping’) parts, an atom is likewise not
simply the sum of its electronic and nuclear constituents. Were not the particles in bound states there
would be no mass difference, and no stable composite object at all; on our Bound State Proposal, of
course, there would be no composite object simpliciter.
A second reason in favour of our Bound-State Proposal is that it avoids objections that begin from the
assumption that every “interesting” (that is, physico-causal) moderate answer to the Question will rest
on conditions that are “inherently vague” (Inwagen (1987: 23)). Van Inwagen (1987: 23), Lewis (1991: 7,
79–81) and Sider (2001: § 4.9) have all argued that a vague answer to the Question leads to unacceptable
kinds of vagueness or indeterminacy (although not everybody agrees with the specifics; see e.g. Hawley
(2004), Noonan (2010)). Our Proposal, by contrast, is based on a sharp distinction — that of whether the
state of a system is bound (total energy E < 0) or free (E > 0) — and therefore does not suffer from any
kind of vagueness, let alone the allegedly pernicious ones envisioned by van Inwagen. On the contrary,
any uncertainty over whether something falls under its extension or not is purely epistemic in character,
resulting merely from the fact that our energy-measuring devices inevitably have finite resolution.
A third reason for endorsing our Bound State Proposal is that it exhibits a simplicity and unity that
comparable proposals lack. To see this, note that, according to Van Inwagen, the appropriate physico-
causal relation that objects will have to stand in in order to form wholes will typically vary with the
kinds of objects involved. Thus elementary particles will be said to compose something iff they are
‘maximally P-bonded’, where P-bonding incorporates features and mechanisms that we take particle
bonding to consist in; atoms, on the other hand, will be said to compose iff they are ‘maximally A-
bonded’, where ‘A-bonding’ refers to whatever sui generis relation is appropriate in the atomic domain
(1987: Section 7). As a result, Van Inwagen proposes (and later rejects) an answer of the following form,
which he terms ‘series-style’:
9y such that the x’s compose y iff the x’s are elementary particles and are maximally P-bonded
or the x’s are atoms and are maximally A-bonded or there is only one of the x’s. (Of course, if
new sui generis composition relations are required as we traverse to macroscopic domains, that
relation and its appropriate kind will appear in a new disjunct.)
The disjunctive, open-ended structure of this criterion, in which different types of relation appear
according to their appropriateness for the kinds of objects involved in each disjunct, is the definitive
feature of ‘series-style’ answers. Our Bound State Proposal, by contrast, does not posit sui generis com-
position relations, which vary with the kinds of objects involved. On the contrary, whether the system
involved consists of the quarks inside a proton or the stars in a distant galaxy, the same principles gov-
ern whether we have a composite object or not (viz. whether they comprise a common bound state). Of
course, the forces involved in generating the relevant potential may differ from case to case, but this is
irrelevant from the perspective of our analysis. Our Proposal may therefore be regarded as completely
generic, and as such it enjoys a unity lacked by the series-style solutions envisaged by Van Inwagen.
We should nonetheless point out that the reason Van Inwagen rejects series-style solutions has little
directly to do with unity. Rather, he rejects them because they apparently violate the transitivity of the
part-whole relation (see Inwagen (1990: 65)) — a condition that is standardly (and plausibly) taken as a
necessary condition on parthood.1 But it will be clear that – as we have thus far defined it at least – our
1Note however that not everyone regards transitivity as necessary: see Rescher (1955), Cruse (1979).
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proposal will violate transitivity as well. The reason for this is that while a electron and the proton are
in each others electro-magnetic potential well (and in doing so comprise the parts of a Hydrogen atom),
and while every quark inside the proton is in the gluon potential of the other quarks (thus comprising
parts of the proton), the electron is not in the potential well of the quarks (electrons are leptons, and
leptons do not interact strongly, only hadrons do). As such, it seems that our Proposal cannot recover
that the quarks are part of the atom, contrary to what transitivity and common sense requires.
At this point, then, we need to amend our Bound State Proposal so as to recover transitivity while
remaining in the spirit of the original scheme. We do this by enriching our proposal to take account of
direct and indirect parts. To do this properly, we need to enter briefly the larger topic of mereological
theory.
4. Mereological Theory
We have noted that we want our final proposal to entail transitivity. We also demand that our proposal
recovers that proper parthood is irreflexive. The question is then how to formulate our Bound-State
Proposal precisely so as to entail both of these.
Generically composition is defined in terms of the primitive part-whole relation — so that a com-
posite is the least part-inclusive object of which the given objects are all parts; this is a natural approach
because the axioms of mereological theories usually concern the part-whole relation directly. We pro-
ceed differently. Our overall framework is some modest set-theory, and physical objects, which are
treated logically as primordial elements (German: Ur-elemente).
Let S be any finite set of physical objects, let #S 2 N+ be the cardinality of set S, and let Comp(S, a)
abbreviate: material object a is some composition of the objects in S. The Bound-State Proposal as previ-
ously formulated will now be an axiom in our mereological theory, and we formulate it as follows.2 As
usual, the part-relation is primitive, and denoted by ‘v’.
Bound-State Proposal.
If S contains a single object, say a, then: Comp(S, a) iff S = {a}. If #S > 2, then: Comp(S, a) iff (i)
if b 2 S, then b is a part of a (a v a); and (ii) (the expectation-value of) the energy of every b 2 S is
negative, i.e. every b 2 S is in a common bound state.
An object b is by definition simple iff it has no proper parts. Then the singleton-set of b is the one and
only set whose member composes b:
Simple(b) iff 8 S : Comp(S, b)  ! S = {b} . (1)
We next define a special kind of part: a is a direct part of b (denoted by: a vd b) iff a is a member of some
set of objects that compose b:
a vd b iff 9 S
 
Comp(S, b) ^ a 2 S  . (2)
With these definitions in place, we advance the following axiom.
2Reformulations into plural logic are possible.
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Part Axiom.
Physical object a is a part of b iff there is some finite sequence of direct parts that begins with a and
ends with b:
a v b iff 9 n 2 N+, 9 c1, c2, . . . , cn : a vd c1 vd c2 vd . . . vd cn vd b . (3)
A part is a direct part iff n = 1 in this axiom, and therefore direct-parthood is a special case of parthood.
Call parts that arise for n > 2 indirect parts. Then a is by definition a proper part of b (notation: a @ b) iff
a is part of b yet not identical to b:
a @ b iff (a v b ^ a 6= b) . (4)
To illustrate definition (3), consider that according to it some top-quark is a part of this Aston Martin
Vanquish, because the top-quark is a direct part of a nucleon, the nucleon is a direct part of an atom, the
atom is direct part of somemolecule, the molecule is a direct part of some car-part (in the car-mechanic’s
sense of the word, such as the bonnet), and that car-part is, as the name says, a direct part of this As-
ton Martin Vanquish. In this sequence of (proper) direct parts, the nuclear interaction is involved in
the first two sequents and from then on all wholes involved are result of electro-magnetic interaction.
Part-whole sequences like this one show that they are not always in harmony with the received onto-
logical hierarchy of natural kinds: the sequence quark–nucleon–nucleus–atom-molecule is presumably
just such a sequence, whereas molecule–bonnet–car is presumably not.
One now easily verifies that simples (1) have no proper parts and have only themselves as parts.
Further one easily verifies that v is reflexive (a v a because of Comp({a}, a)) and transitive (a v b and
b v c leads to two finite parthood sequences that form a longer one, having a and c at its beginning
and end, respectively, so that a v c). Hence both of the desiderata on a mereological theory mentioned
earlier are fulfilled. We consider the fact that these features of the part-whole relation follow from our
Bound-State Proposal, and therefore need not be assumed axiomatically, to constitute a fourth reason in
favour of our Bound-State Proposal.
5. The Entanglement Proposal
For all the successes of our Bound State Proposal, however, one might worry that physical theory mo-
tivates a different proposal that we have not yet considered. This is what we can call the Entanglement
Proposal. What encourages this proposal is the fact that quantum theory seems to recognize another
species of composite system in addition to bound states: namely, collections of N particles that are in
entangled states. As such, the Entanglement Proposalwill say that a collection of objects forms a compos-
ite if and only if the state of the collection is entangled.
Entanglement Proposal. Suppose we have a collection of N objects, the j-th object having Hilbert-
space Hj as representing its possible physical states, and suppose Hilbert-vector |yi 2 H repre-
sents the state of the collection that provides the correct measurement results and their relative fre-
quencies, notably including correlations between measurement results of the different objects. The
collection of N forms a composite object iff (i) H = H1 ⌦ . . .⌦HN ; and (ii) |yi 2 H is entangled,
which means that |yi is not ⌦-factorisable, which in turn means that there are no Hilbert-vectors
|fji 2 Hj such that: |yi = |fji ⌦ |f2i ⌦ . . .⌦ |fNi .
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Like composites in bound states, composites in entangled states are distinct from mere ‘fusions’:
characteristic of entangled states is the fact that they cannot be determined just from the properties of
the component parts. Nevertheless, the Entanglement Proposal is clearly at odds with our own. While
it is true that quantum mechanics tells us that interacting systems get entangled with each other as
a result of their interaction (so that composites satisfying the Bound State Proposal also meet this new
proposal too), the converse is false: we can have entangled states of composite systems of particles that
do not, or no longer, interact. For example, when a pair of photons leaves an atom in an entangled state,
they come into being at the moment the atom drops to a lower energy state and immediately fly apart;
they do not interact and have not interacted (because bosons, save gluons, cannot interact and do never
form bound systems), but are in an entangled state. Thus while we emphasized above that interaction
is necessary but not sufficient for composition according to the Bound State Proposal, here precisely the
opposite situation prevails: interaction now turns out to be sufficient but not necessary. As such, the
Bound State Proposal and the Entanglement Proposal give different answers to the Question. Since the
last-mentioned is motivated by our most fundamental theory of matter, one might think that our first
Proposal should graciously give way to it.
Nevertheless, we contend that our Bound State Proposal remains the right answer to the Question.
We shall provide three reasons in support of it. The first derives from the fact, already noted, that
in a strict sense every object is interacting with every other, for two of the four fundamental physical
interactions have an infinite range (electro-magnetic and gravitational). (Although in many cases the
entanglement will be so slight as to be neglicible ‘for all practical purposes, that by no means entails
that it may be regarded as insignificant for metaphysical purposes.) As such, strictly speaking the En-
tanglement Proposal amounts to Universalism. Since we hold that moderate answers to the question are
to be preferred over their extreme counterparts, this counts against the tenability of the Entanglement
Proposal as an answer to the Question.
The second reason derives from the fact that scientists seem to succeed in discriminating composite
systems even in regimes in which quantum-physical effects do not enter into their considerations. For
example, we discussed above planetary and galactic systems and identified conditions in which the
systems may be said to comprise composites that were in agreement with our intuitions. But of course,
pending a quantum theory of gravity we have no idea how to model such situations quantum-physically.
Thus whatever it is that was driving these intuitions, it cannot be quantum in character. To be clear, we
are not claiming that systems such as these do not have a nature that is ultimately quantum-physical,
however it is that that nature will turn out to be understood. What we are claiming is that it is not in
virtue of some feature of this unknown nature that makes it the case that they comprise a composite
system: rather it is simply by virtue of the feature, known to us now as it has been for centuries, that
they are in a bound state.
The third and final point that we would like to emphasize is that we are not denying that entan-
glement represents another way — indeed another way rubber-stamped by physics — for systems to
compose in a significant sense. But as Healey notes, there are all sorts of notions of composition at work
in physics (Healey 2013). What we are claiming is that the Bound State Proposal identifies the sort of
composition that is relevant to the Special Composition Question discussed in metaphysics. Since that is the
question we set our ourselves to the task of answering, we take it that our task is complete.
Or, perhaps we should say, almost complete. For P. Teller (2015) levelled the following counter-
example to the Bound-State Proposal (see picture): jacket and trousers are parts of a suit, but they are
not together in a bound state due to their mutual physical interaction. The Entanglement Proposal par-
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enthetically provides the same judgment. Now what? Well, our judgement that trousers and jacket are
parts of a suit is conventional, compared to property rights; and when the composition is conventional,
mereological proposals need not cover it.
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